A Pashtoon’s other problems in Kabul
As if the bloody insurgency, bombing and widespread violence are not enough, people from Helmand, Kandahar, Urozgan and Zabul are now subject to institutional discrimination and sometimes even official hatred in government offices in Kabul.
Young men from the south often prefer to visit Quetta and Karachi cities in the neighbouring Pakistan than their national capital Kabul. Reasons for this common unease and feeling of alienation lay not only in the post-Taliban security arrangements in Kabul in which southern Pashtoon are widely regarded and vexed as the Taliban because of their language and clothing style, but also because they’re institutionally discriminated.
In the aftermath of the Taliban’s demise state apparatuses and bureaucracy have been predominantly occupied by the victorious anti-Taliban forces and collaborators. Hamid Karzai, who considers himself an undisputable and patriarchic Pashtoon representative, has been reluctant to ensure Pashtoons’ meaningful presence in the government in Kabul because he is afraid doing so could stint his political career and would endanger his dreams to be a “national leader”.
It is now a modus operandi for bribers inside the Kabul passport department to demand extra 2,000 Afghanis (US$40) for those that hold Tazkira (identity card) from Helmand, Urozgan, Kandahar and Zabul provinces. I asked one of these bribers (who actually help a lot of people to bypass wasteful bureaucratic ramblings by the virtue of their money) why the price tag is higher for the southern Pashtoons, the reply was: “because these people are problematic and disliked by officials”.
In the ministry of higher education, lists are often screened and filtered internally before students are delegated to different faculties after every matriculation exam in order to drop as much Pashtoon students from entry into popular faculties (medicine, law, economics, engineering etc) as possible.
And of course the situation gets worse in the notoriously corrupt judicial and security institutions (police and intelligence in particular).
It is true Mr. Karzai has been backed by his own tribe (Popalzai) and a few other chieftains who have manipulated power and governance in some provinces and have continuously extorted and scored personal and ethnic vendettas. However, for many young peasants in the south Kabul has turned into a nightmare and a place full of risks, hatred and discriminations.
As if the bloody insurgency, bombing and widespread violence are not enough, people from Helmand, Kandahar, Urozgan and Zabul are now subject to institutional discrimination and sometimes even official hatred in government offices in Kabul.
Young men from the south often prefer to visit Quetta and Karachi cities in the neighbouring Pakistan than their national capital Kabul. Reasons for this common unease and feeling of alienation lay not only in the post-Taliban security arrangements in Kabul in which southern Pashtoon are widely regarded and vexed as the Taliban because of their language and clothing style, but also because they’re institutionally discriminated.
In the aftermath of the Taliban’s demise state apparatuses and bureaucracy have been predominantly occupied by the victorious anti-Taliban forces and collaborators. Hamid Karzai, who considers himself an undisputable and patriarchic Pashtoon representative, has been reluctant to ensure Pashtoons’ meaningful presence in the government in Kabul because he is afraid doing so could stint his political career and would endanger his dreams to be a “national leader”.
It is now a modus operandi for bribers inside the Kabul passport department to demand extra 2,000 Afghanis (US$40) for those that hold Tazkira (identity card) from Helmand, Urozgan, Kandahar and Zabul provinces. I asked one of these bribers (who actually help a lot of people to bypass wasteful bureaucratic ramblings by the virtue of their money) why the price tag is higher for the southern Pashtoons, the reply was: “because these people are problematic and disliked by officials”.
In the ministry of higher education, lists are often screened and filtered internally before students are delegated to different faculties after every matriculation exam in order to drop as much Pashtoon students from entry into popular faculties (medicine, law, economics, engineering etc) as possible.
And of course the situation gets worse in the notoriously corrupt judicial and security institutions (police and intelligence in particular).
It is true Mr. Karzai has been backed by his own tribe (Popalzai) and a few other chieftains who have manipulated power and governance in some provinces and have continuously extorted and scored personal and ethnic vendettas. However, for many young peasants in the south Kabul has turned into a nightmare and a place full of risks, hatred and discriminations.
