Afghan Taliban thrive as Pakistani Taliban die

Pakistani Taliban seem to be leaderless again. Their latest leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, was reportedly killed by a drone attack in the Northern Waziristan in January. Hakim had substituted Baitullah Mehsud who was also killed in US drone bombing in 2009.

Over the past few years dozens of senior Pakistani Taliban leaders have been killed by the pilotless aircrafts which are controlled by the US military.

Most of the targeted Pakistani Taliban were behind appalling attacks inside Pakistan.

Pakistani Taliban leaders are dying one after another while Mullah Omar and his senior cadres are operating freely in Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province. The existence, location and operation of the so called Quetta Shura of Afghan Taliban have been confirmed by almost everyone (even the ICRC has referred to Quetta Shura Taliban, read for instance: "Risky Ally in War on Polio: the Taliban"). In his widely-reported leaked assessment of the Afghanistan situation, the commander of all international forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, clearly mentions the Quetta Shura Taliban as a supreme entity which motivates, equips, directs and drives the bloody insurgency in Afghanistan.

Indeed, Mullah Omar and his al Qaeda patrons have killed more American and other NATO soldiers in Afghanistan (let alone thousands of Afghans) than Mehsuds and Pakistani Taliban that mostly fight the Pakistani military.

A question that vexes me is why are the Taliban being treated differently based on their nationality and area of operation? In other words, why are drone attacks restricted to North and South Waziristan where mostly Pakistani Taliban operate?

I hate bombs and bombings but if drone attacks are so useful in crippling the Pakistani Taliban, why are they not extended to Quetta to “dismantle, disrupt and defeat” the Quetta Shura Taliban?

Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity has already and repeatedly been breached by drone attacks and special kill/capture operations by US military in the FATA, therefore bombing Mullah Omar and his senior commanders in Baluchistan would not mean a major shift in the modus operandi.

But, this seems of the radar.

Alas! Am I suggesting bombing the headquarters of the next Prime Minister of Afghanistan in Quetta?

Doesn’t Afghanistan need a restart?

DONORS have agreed to buy off the Taliban with US$140 million: equivalent to one-day US military expenses in Afghanistan.

Indeed, the West could do so in 2002-2004 when the Taliban were a group of defeated, disappointed, hated and fleeing individuals.

However a resurgent, strengthened and resourceful armed opposition which loudly chants victory could be hardly lured now to lay down arms and submit to a government which is mired in corruption, inefficiency and warlordism.

At the eve of the much publicized London Conference the Taliban leadership said in a statement: “If we were fighting for money, power or protection in foreign countries we had better and stronger offers during our reign.”

Over the past eight years the same donors that have pledged $140 million to buy off the Taliban spent over $300 billion on warfare to kill, capture and defeat the Taliban. If spent on true rebuilding, development and poverty-alleviation half of the amount could have turned Afghanistan to a model country in South Asia where hundreds of foreign soldiers and thousands of Afghans would not have had died.

The US and its NATO-allies have lately reached into a realization that every Talib cannot be eliminated but some have to be assured that they have a place in their country and in their government. However, this belated realization is accompanied by too little understanding of the means to win over the Taliban.

If I were a Talib – gladly I am not - I would not have submitted to Karzai’s government for a couple of dollars or a temporary job for the very Karzai government is the problem not an appropriate means to solution.

The promised $140 million fund and the political rhetoric of “reintegration” would soon dissipate in the quagmire of failures and corruption Mr. Karzai has generously maintained since 2002.

Yes, most of Taliban rank-and-files are unemployed, poor and mostly illiterate rural youths who would love to have a job, an income and a life away from fighting. But money and jobs alone would not entice the peasants to defy a very strong – if not winning – Taliban and embrace a government which has lost in all fronts.

Radical and impractical would many call this but truly saving Afghanistan requires rebooting the whole post-Boon system. By this, I mean removing the failing Karzai and his corrupto-criminals from the power and re-launching a genuinely Afghan Loya Jirga to form a new governing body. Don’t allow warlords, criminals and other thugs to mock democracy by re-manipulating the power with money, terror and mischief. The new government’s No. 1 agenda should be “justice” through which all criminals and warlords must be trailed.

With Karzai and his corrupto-criminals there is no road to peace and settlement and spending more on his plans would be just waste of lives, money and time.

Is BBC doing war propaganda?

EVEN President Karzai has doubted the findings of a self-contradictory polling by BBC/ABC/ARD televisions on Afghans’ perceptions of governance, development, security and popularity of the warring parties. Although the debatable opinion survey gives the embattled president top marks in leadership and performance yet in an interview with ABC Mr. Karzai said: “I don’t know…we’ve been in power for eight years and that’s a long time. People get tired of seeing the same faces and the same performance…so I hope the 70 percent is true.”

The polling says 67% of the 1,534 respondents said billions of foreign aid dollars have not eased their sufferings but 66% said their living conditions have improved over the past eight years. Over 76% said corruption is a major problem, but 70% approved the performance of their corrupt government. It says optimism on the future direction of the country hiked from 40% in 2009 to 70% in 2010 but it does not mention what on earth prompted 30% to change opinion after some of the bloodiest and most controversial months since the ouster of the Taliban?

Let’s contextualize the polling’s extraordinary assertions beyond basic mathematics.

Over the past one year Washington’s fierce criticisms of corruption and inefficiency in Kabul’s regime yielded no good but raised serious questions in the West whether it was necessary to prop up the regime with blood and treasure.

Amid the electoral crisis in September-November two realities vexed policy-makers in Washington and London: First, Karzai was intractably alienated and there was almost no leverage on him, and second, the anti-Karzai rhetoric was fueling the Taliban’s propaganda. In fact, in September both Washington and the Quetta Shura were united in lashing out at Karzai as ‘corrupt, inept and illegitimate’.

President Obama spent months before presenting a rationale for the deployment of additional 30,000 US troops to Afghanistan to safeguard the Kabul government. He boasted about the end of “blank cheque” era and promised to return soldiers home in 18 months.

As U.S. and its European allies seek to formalize devolving responsibilities to Afghans through the London Conference on 28 January – in order to facilitate a graceful exit – the conditions in Afghanistan must be depicted ripe for this major policy shift. U.S. and European citizens must be convinced that almost nine years after the Taliban and with billions of dollars and thousands of lives spent Afghans are happy and ready to say goodbye to foreign troops.

To depict a favourite picture and breathe live into a failing Kabul government nothing could do better than a least expected polling from BBC/ABC/ARD channels at a critical juncture. After all, what part of the BBC’s charter allow the broadcaster to do sensitive polling in other countries?

The self-deceptive survey would be used as a tool by participants of the London conference to justify policies which aim to drag the ill-prepared Kabul government into the midst of the exit project.

Our beloved ministers

(Note: I wrote this piece a day before the Wolesi Jirga voted on the cabinet)

As Hamid Karzai goes out of favour due to rampant corruption and inefficiency some of his key ministers are befriended by Western officials to facilitate a face-saving exit.

Omar Zakhilwal, the nominated minister of finance, is now at days the beloved darling of Western diplomats in Kabul. Because he has been perceived as efficient and uncorrupt by the powerful diplomatic and aid community, Mr. Zakhilwal is enjoying personal political support and his ministry has been receiving generous funding. Some foreigners even propose him to take up the role of a super-coordinator and/or manager of the entire development enterprise in Afghanistan.

Although new into the ministers’ club, Omar seems to be gradually outpacing Hanif Atmar and Rahim Wardak the two US/UK-favourite ministers of the interior and defence.

Apart from his glorified tenure in the rural rehabilitation and development ministry (MRRD) Mr. Atmar failed to sort out the mess in the education ministry (2005-2008), and seems paralyzed in bringing order into his current interior ministry.

Obviously competency is not what drives Rahim Wardak as the defence minister, but he has been blessed by his own and his son’s deep ties with US military and intelligence heavyweights in Kabul and beyond.

Giving the three key ministries of interior, defence and finance to Pashtuns was not expected from a Karzai who has a sensitive style of ethnic inclusiveness and power-sharing. The weakened and isolated Karzai had received clear instructions to satisfy his Tajik and Hazara allies elsewhere in the cabinet.

Dollars, political support and other resources will surely usher Messrs Zakhilwal, Atmar and Wardak through the parliamentary approval and they all will have to handle big projects designed by their Western patrons.

My Afghani wisdom tells me that the personification of international community’s approach is as flawed as the 200-2008 development and democratization of Afghanistan. We need system-and-institution-building development not individual-based policies in which the departure of an individual minister marks the end of donors’ interest and funding to a ministry. Almost nine years after the Taliban we terribly suffer Washington’s Karzai-centric approach to Afghanistan as a result of which a failing president has been failing a nation.

I am amazed by the naivety of those who justify the personified approach as transfer of authority to Afghans or the so called “Afghanisation”. Washington has made no secret of its policy of direct support for “competent and uncorrupt” ministers and governors in a bid to tackle corruption and ineptitude in the Afghan government. As such, the new policy is picking and supporting ministers like Zakhilwal and Atmar.

This policy is wrong. It creates a culture of cronyism where ministers and governors will seek to satisfy their foreign patrons instead of meaningfully serving their Afghan constituencies.

Moreover, picking a handful of ministers and governors to do things the way the US and its allies want is actually Americanising the Afghan development and governance – not Afghanising the process.

How can Zakhilwal, Atmar and Wardak change the lot of Afghanistan when their boss – Karzai - is weak, ostracized and doomed to failure?

It would look very cynical to suggest that Washington and London do not support ministers and governors to change the wrongs of Afghanistan but to engineer their own exit. Are the three beloved ministers commissioned to finance, train and prepare a large Afghan mercenary force to which NATO will eventually outsource the war?

Alas! This seems to be an imperialistic project.