Ashraf Ghani, Ali Ahmad Jalali and Dr. Abdullah are negotiating a unified electoral team to contest Hamid Karzai in the August presidential elections. Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi and Gol Agha Sherzai have talked on how to work together and mobilize Pashtuns.. The grand coalition of warlords and power-brokers – the so called United Front – has been disintegrating as almost all individual members have been seeking the presidency but none has proved his leadership. Iranian agents and diplomats have been doing their best to strike a deal among key figures of the Front but the flooding Iranian Riyals are yet to win reliable loyalty and consent. Several fortune-and-fame seekers have also prematurely announced their candidacy hoping they will secure cash and other privileges in return for their backing of another candidate at the eve of pooling.
Most of Karzai’s formidable rivals in the August elections will be men who were his former underlings and who have accused the incumbent of ineptitude, corruption and lack of vision. The increasingly isolated Hamid Karzai, whose mental fitness has been gossipingly and rather sarcastically disputed in diplomatic circles, has accused even his deputies of laying conspiracies to strip him of power. Karzai has never felt so forlorn, ostracized and weak. His hope to quell his contenders through a snap election ended in smoke and he has been facing a crisis of legitimacy beyond May when his reign must end according to the constitution.
His rivals and opposition are calling for a caretaker administration to transit the government from May until an elected president will assume the power. This is a bad choice for an already fragile state which has been facing security and political crises.
The call that Karzai should step down as the president but continue to lead the government with limited and supervised terms of reference has strong merits but the country lacks institutional mechanisms to effectively translate that into action. Who will supervise Mr. Karzai, how and what could be done if he is found guilty of any transgression? Who will manage the government’s apparatuses?
Karzai has no doubt that his losing possibility will double if he leaves the presidential Arg in the transitional period (May-August), so he has fiercely insisted on staying the course. Undoubtedly he will use every privilege of the incumbency – and will most probably abuse his powers – to ensure his victory in the next election.
“I’ve only now tasted the flavor of power and am not going to abandon it soon,” Karzai brazenly told students of the Kabul Medical University in 2008.
Mr. Karzai knows well that Afghanistan and the US do not have an immediate substitution for him and despite all the fuss on his weakness, corruption and inefficiency he has better chances of winning the election in August 2009.
Here are the six main reasons why Karzai will be reelected:
1) He enjoys numerous privileges of incumbency including the power to hire and fire officials
2) His opposition is disorganized, weak and lack unity
3) He does not run on a single ethnicity ticket, he appeals to Tajiks, Hazaras and other minorities as much as he tries to have Pashtuns
4) He is good in breaking opposition coalition by choosing one or two as his election mates (he may pick Qasim Fahim – the Panjshiry warlord – as his 1st mate)
5) Despite strong criticisms, he is still favored by the US and other major players
6) He is an intelligent orator, has the skills to appease critics and is extraordinary good in justifying his failures
Despite these strong points, Karzai’s reelection will hinge on what Zalmay Khalilzad (former US ambassador to Afghanistan and the UN) will do in the months ahead.
After completing his retirement package with the State Department, Mr Khalilzad rushed into Kabul, met Hamid Karzai and several other key figures and organized a high profile conference in Dubai in March.
Khalilzad is not only Karzai’s strong mentor he also wields extensive influence in the US foreign policy apparatus. Karzai will not dare contest Khalilzad, if the later will decide to challenge the first. He is also Washington’s troubleshooter in Afghanistan and therefore has many tools to help any candidate become the next president.
Let’s see what will be Khalilzad’s post-Dubai move. Will he run for the Afghan presidency or will he help Karzai’s reelection?
Most of Karzai’s formidable rivals in the August elections will be men who were his former underlings and who have accused the incumbent of ineptitude, corruption and lack of vision. The increasingly isolated Hamid Karzai, whose mental fitness has been gossipingly and rather sarcastically disputed in diplomatic circles, has accused even his deputies of laying conspiracies to strip him of power. Karzai has never felt so forlorn, ostracized and weak. His hope to quell his contenders through a snap election ended in smoke and he has been facing a crisis of legitimacy beyond May when his reign must end according to the constitution.
His rivals and opposition are calling for a caretaker administration to transit the government from May until an elected president will assume the power. This is a bad choice for an already fragile state which has been facing security and political crises.
The call that Karzai should step down as the president but continue to lead the government with limited and supervised terms of reference has strong merits but the country lacks institutional mechanisms to effectively translate that into action. Who will supervise Mr. Karzai, how and what could be done if he is found guilty of any transgression? Who will manage the government’s apparatuses?
Karzai has no doubt that his losing possibility will double if he leaves the presidential Arg in the transitional period (May-August), so he has fiercely insisted on staying the course. Undoubtedly he will use every privilege of the incumbency – and will most probably abuse his powers – to ensure his victory in the next election.
“I’ve only now tasted the flavor of power and am not going to abandon it soon,” Karzai brazenly told students of the Kabul Medical University in 2008.
Mr. Karzai knows well that Afghanistan and the US do not have an immediate substitution for him and despite all the fuss on his weakness, corruption and inefficiency he has better chances of winning the election in August 2009.
Here are the six main reasons why Karzai will be reelected:
1) He enjoys numerous privileges of incumbency including the power to hire and fire officials
2) His opposition is disorganized, weak and lack unity
3) He does not run on a single ethnicity ticket, he appeals to Tajiks, Hazaras and other minorities as much as he tries to have Pashtuns
4) He is good in breaking opposition coalition by choosing one or two as his election mates (he may pick Qasim Fahim – the Panjshiry warlord – as his 1st mate)
5) Despite strong criticisms, he is still favored by the US and other major players
6) He is an intelligent orator, has the skills to appease critics and is extraordinary good in justifying his failures
Despite these strong points, Karzai’s reelection will hinge on what Zalmay Khalilzad (former US ambassador to Afghanistan and the UN) will do in the months ahead.
After completing his retirement package with the State Department, Mr Khalilzad rushed into Kabul, met Hamid Karzai and several other key figures and organized a high profile conference in Dubai in March.
Khalilzad is not only Karzai’s strong mentor he also wields extensive influence in the US foreign policy apparatus. Karzai will not dare contest Khalilzad, if the later will decide to challenge the first. He is also Washington’s troubleshooter in Afghanistan and therefore has many tools to help any candidate become the next president.
Let’s see what will be Khalilzad’s post-Dubai move. Will he run for the Afghan presidency or will he help Karzai’s reelection?
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