A Question of Legitimacy

The less than 40 percent turnout of registered voters will undoubtedly shadow the legitimacy of the future administration.

Out of the 17 million registered voters in the country only about five million cast ballots on 20 August, according to the IEC.

Regardless of the mounting allegations about widespread and systematic fraud, rigging and abuse in the elections process the very low turnout of voters seriously threatens the legitimacy of the future government.

A majority of the registered voters did not turn up for polling because of prevalent insecurity, intimidations from the Taliban and other constrains. The turnout was particularly low in the insecure south, east and central provinces where Taliban insurgents are most influential.

Disenchantment with the existing political process, a lack of trust in the elections, poor awareness and a number of other factors also compounded the problem.

It is a pity to have an election mired in fraud, ambiguity and less than 40 percent of turnout after over seven years of internationalized state-building and democratization.

The elections were bankrolled by over US$220 million funding from donors and were technically administered by the UN. Although UNAMA has said that the elections process has been led by Afghans it cannot camouflage its crucial role in the overall management of the process.

The lack of an appropriate quorum on voters’ participation in the polling originates from a major flaw in Afghanistan’s Electoral Law which stipulates the winner of an election the winner of 50+1 percent of ballots.

Under the current law a president can be the winner of 51 votes if 100 people cast votes.

“Whatever Gen. Dostum orders!”


The warlord’s return is apparently in defiance to Washington's policy but Kabul has imported the burly commander to stop Uzbek’s switching from the incumbent to Dr Abdullah. Junbish was increasingly divided in the absence of its brutal leader.

Upon his arrival the alleged war-criminal declared unreserved support to Mr. Karzai and brought warm regards from his Turkish patron, Abdullah Gul, to his fellow commanders.

Dostum’s return to Afghanistan has been celebrated as the return of a national hero.

The first call the Gen. received upon his arrival at the Kabul airport was from Mr. Karzai who asked if the Gen. needed anything. “Thanks Mr. President! I am grateful to your kindness,” Dostum replied.

The second call was from the much-praised Hanif Atmar, the Interior Minister, who assured the Gen. that the Afghan National Police are at his disposal.

“Thanks to Mr. Atmar…he has instructed the police commanders to do as General Dostum orders,” Dostum proudly told a crowd in the north on 17 August.

Kai Eide and many other diplomats strongly back Mr. Atmar as a “reformist and a technocrat” but in reality Mr. Atmar is no good than his boss who knows no ethical boundaries in sticking to power.

The US Embassy has expressed dissatisfaction with the dignified return of Gen. Dostum. A US national security team is currently looking into details of a massacre of over 2,000 Taliban prisoners in late 2001 by Dostum’s militias.

Who can dare talk to the team investigators and present evidence while the alleged criminal is commanding the police and is treated as the president’s reelection ticket?

The over US$200 million the U.S., the EU and other donors spend for the holding of “democratic elections” are unwittingly used to re-legitimize, re-strengthen and return notorious warlords in order to re-elect corrupt and inept officials.

And as for the national police, they are abused as political tools to protect warlords and criminals than the Afghan public.

The Most Likely Scenario of the Presidential Election

The traditional King-Makers – the Pashtuns – are unlikely to give Hamid Karzai an easy victory in the first round because they are divided, disappointed and intimidated: Some dislike Karzai and may vote to Ashraf Ghani and/or other Pashtun candidates; some may not vote for personal reasons (disenchantment and political inertia); and some will not take part in the polling because of the Taliban’s threat.

Despite heavy pay-offs to the minority warlords – Muhaqiq and Dostum - the incumbent would not harvest millions of easy votes from the Hazaras and the Uzbeks.

The North cannot bless Abdullah with a definite victory. A “run-off” is therefore most likely unless Mr. Karzai would act irrationally and rig the results.

Dr Ghani is unlikely to make it to the second round but the race will be between Karzai and Abdullah.

The post-results period will be extremely crucial for the two run-off contenders.

Karzai will use all his compromising tools – including the infamous Chief Executive post - to entice Ghani who would most probably choose to support Karzai than Abdullah.

Karzai will win but he will end up in a self-made Pandora of an already bartered government where he will be hammered by his rival warlords and the Obama administration.

In order to shut Abdullah’s Panjshiri thugs several ministries, governorships and embassies will be offered to Mr. Abdullah albeit in addition to the showing of some teeth from the US.

In the coming five years Ghani will be helped to win the 2014 election and replace Karzai in future.