Brits are too unpopular in Karzai’s Kabul

Long after British colonialism ended in South Asia and despite its substantial development aid to Afghanistan, mutual trust is still absent between Kabul and London.

Mr. Karzai has too many reasons for his increased suspicions on British policies in his country.

He is particularly incensed about the chaos in Helmand Province where thousands of British soldiers and intelligence officers have created a mini satellite state. President Karzai has repeatedly said – both in public and private – that since Brits have gone to Helmand his government has lost control there and he is personally unaware of the decisions made in Helmand.

The October 2006 deal between UK forces and the Taliban over Musa Qala District; the ouster of Helmand’s former governor Shir Mohammad Akhundzada; and Helmand’s booming opium production are some of the issues which have seriously frustrated Mr. Karzai.

In the international arena Britain’s cordial relationship and massive aid to Karzai’s utmost rival Islamabad has further soured relations between Kabul and London. Karzai wants London to use its leverage over Pakistanis to end their covert support for Afghan Taliban.

Britain’s post-colonial approach to the region could be understandable to Pakistanis and Indians, but it has only confused and embarrassed Afghans.

In late 2006, after the Musa Qala’s dilemma, Karzai started purging his administration from Afghans who were educated and/or had returned from the UK. A close aide told me that Mr. Karzai cancelled several senior level appointees only because they were perceived “too close to the UK”.

The bizarre rejection of the British politician Paddy Ashdown as UN envoy to Afghanistan marked President Karzai’s impatience towards the UK.

Mr. Karzai wants more authority over the affairs in Helmand Province and asks for transparency in Britain’s involvement with Pakistan.

London, on the other hand, considers Karzai a weak and impotent leader whose authority does not stretch beyond his palace, leave aside the far-fledged Helmand.

Over the past two years Kabul and London have unwittingly maintained a hate-love scenario only because both want to keep vital partnership with the U.S.

Ironically Washington has spared genuine efforts to reconcile frustrated Karzai with London and has not done enough to revive trust between the two.

Perhaps the understanding in the U.S. is that it would be wise to leave the problem for new administrations in Washington, London and probably Kabul in 2009.

[ENDS]