The Perils of Premature Afghanisation

Hamid Karzai, the self-proclaimed president of Afghanistan, and his corrupto-criminal allies are by no means ready or fit to take on responsibilities for all political, development and security affairs in Afghanistan. Karzai is fiercely seeking absolute sovereignty from the world in order to unilaterally run the country as his personal fiefdom. Giving this unreliable partner all what he wants will spoil the blood and treasure spent in the post-Taliban Afghanistan and will plunge the country in a chaotic feudalism.

There is no legitimate and competent political class in Afghanistan that can effectively assume the unassisted management of the country’s complex challenges. Corruption and cronyism are rampant and the Kabul regime, totally manipulated by warlords and criminals, has been ranked second only to Somalia in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.

Politically the country is worryingly fragmented among rival groups loyal to Iran, Pakistan, India and other external powers. Over four months have gone since the re-inauguration of Mr. Karzai but almost half of his cabinet ministers are yet to be nominated and approved by an increasingly antagonistic parliament which recently rejected Karzai’s totalitarian amendments to the electoral law.

Security is worse than all times since the hardliner Taliban were ousted in late 2001. The quick fixes applied by donors in the national security sector have created a mercenary police and army that are hardly able to secure their own barracks without international military forces. The arrival of additional U.S. forces to fight back the insurgents from key southern provinces is widely perceived as a temporary remedy to the country’s untamable security challenges. In Marja city, in the southern Helmand province, the Taliban have told locals they will return in July 2011; when American forces will start leaving the country according to President Obama’s strategy.

Administratively the landlocked South Asian country is plagued by the legacy of over three decades of unrelenting war, brain drain and a lack of basic infrastructures necessary for the delivery of services and governance. Almost half of school-age children are out of school, everyday 48 mothers and scores of children die from preventable and curable diseases, and over half of the estimated 28 million population live with less than US$1 a day.

Hamid Karzai is at odd with Washington and London more than any time before in his political career. On 1 April Karzai accused the U.S., the UN and the EU of orchestrating “massive” fraud in the 2009 Presidential Elections. Like Iran’s Mahmud Ahmadinejad, Karzai thinks the U.S. is trying to “colonize” the region and install puppet regimes. He recently confided at journalists his personal determination to “stand up” to the U.S.’s colonial ambitions. Karzai has proved he is always ready to offer himself for sale to Russia, China and Iran if Washington stops providing him the blank cheques he used to receive from President George W. Bush.

Not only are the Taliban too strong and are seriously threatening to topple the Karzai regime should NATO forces withdraw quickly but the unfolding regional panorama is also too detrimental for the future of a stable Afghanistan. Intelligence and military officials in Islamabad, Tehran, Delhi and Moscow are strategizing on a post-U.S. Afghanistan divided among traditional Pashtun, Tajek, Uzbek and Hazara warlords and power brokers.

However, tired of an increasingly costly war American and European leaders have started a chorus of “Afghanisation” at a critical juncture while the destabilizing country urgently needs an overhauled strategic engagement from the West.

Contrary to the predominant pessimism that the war in Afghanistan is unwinnable and that Afghans are naturally unfit with democratic governance both peace and democracy are achievable in this ill-perceived Muslim country.

Afghans are not fighting each other out of luxury. They are sick of war.

For the current waves of armed violence, however, some Afghans have reasons, some have grievances and some others are being misled or exploited by internal and regional war-mongers. The problem of conflict in Afghanistan has been compounded by a huge lack of knowledge in the international community about the very reasons, grievances and incentives which fuel violence and rebellion.

Apart from Hamid Karzai and his travel jamboree policy-makers in outside Afghanistan have hardly known ordinary Afghans. Little is known in Kabul and Washington about the motives of young Kandaharis and Helmandis who are killing their own country’s police, army and government officials. Little is heard from educated youths in Kabul and Herat.

The Afghan war cannot be won in the far remote districts in Helmand and Kandahar. It cannot be the killing and capturing of rural Pashtun youths.

An Afghanisation is not and is different from total Karzai-o-fication of Afghanistan’s affairs.

Surrendering Afghanistan to Hamid Karzai’s paralyzed regime will be a catastrophic mistake similar to the one the Soviets did in 1989.

Irrefutably Karzai has failed. He must not fail Afghanistan with himself. And Afghans must not be forced to share his failure either.

Returning to Afghans the ultimate command over their country is an unavoidable destination. The world must have strategic patience until Afghans get ready to run their country alone.

Time is not right for Afghanisation now. It is time to find, befriend and empower competent Afghans who can take charge in the foreseeable future.